Uzbekistan's higher education system has undergone some dramatic changes in the past century, evolving from largely traditional religious colleges to fully state-funded communist-atheist institutions. Since the end of the communist administration and subsequent market-oriented reforms, the institutions of higher education (IHE) in Uzbekistan have had to reinvent and reform themselves again, as the demand for different kind of education increased. This paper puts the current changes and trends in IHEs into an historical perspective and highlights some important effects of the market reforms on the educational scene.
Introduction
Three independent khanates, centred in Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand had dominated Turkistan between the 16th and 19th centuries before the region was occupied by Russia towards the end of the 19th century. Having ousted the Tsar and taking power in Russia, the Bolsheviks set up socialist republics in the former Russian colonies. Uzbekistan was created in the early 1920s as part of a 'national delimitation' that re-divided Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand into new national republics. Uzbekistan SSR inherited the majority of the territories of these khanates, including all three capital cities.
The Soviet government set out to reshape dramatically the society in Uzbekistan and they needed an educational system to facilitate this change. They changed the education system from one of backward, religious institutions to a secular system built upon Marxist/Leninist ideology within two decades. The system they built, designed to eradicate illiteracy and facilitate social engineering, was geared towards creating a homogeneous Soviet citizen.
While the Soviet education system had achieved impressive results, even by international standards, the higher education system in Uzbekistan had to be reformed fundamentally again after independence in order to enable it to meet the demands of an emerging market economy with a rapidly increasing population. The Uzbek government has already carried out a comprehensive overhaul of the entire education system and continues to provide relatively high levels of funding for the sector.
The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the changes which the Uzbek higher educational system has experienced since the times of the khanates and to offer constructive policy recommendations for further improvement. After this short introductory section, Section 2 and Section 3 describe the Uzbek education system before and after the October revolution respectively. Section 4, discusses the nature of reforms that have been carried out in the education sector of the country since independence, focusing particularly on the higher education sector reforms. Finally, Section 5, discusses some possible limitations of the present system and offers suggestions for further strengthening the system.
The Central Asian Education System before the Soviet Reforms
The Soviet academics/authorities maintained the view, which became the conventional wisdom for sovietologists worldwide, that before the Bolshevik revolution, the education system in Central Asia was extremely backward with an estimated adult literacy rate of as low as 2% (Grenoble 2003) . 1 However, more recent and detailed studies, based on information that became available only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, reveal that the pre-Soviet education system was more robust and had its own merits, which had been ignored by the Soviet writers.
It had been, for many centuries, a tradition of Central Asian kings and princes to take great pride in the size of their libraries and the entourage of prominent scholars and poets in their courts. They extended their generous patronage to the brightest literary and scientific minds of their time and provided educational institutions with landed estates which were used to fund schools (maktab) and colleges (madrasa). Maktabs were the starting points where pupils would learn reading, writing, and other basic life skills. The more talented of the pupils would move onto madrasas for further education where they would spend over 10 years studying theology, literature, law, philosophy, and other 'worldly wisdom'. The curriculum was heavily based on Islamic teachings, as the Shariah was the Law of the Land. The noteworthy feature of the system was that both maktabs and madrasas were free for the general public, funded by the landed estates and charitable donations, which included gifts from the parents of their pupils.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the number of madrasas in the Bukharan emirate alone, with a population of around 5 million, had been estimated to be about 180 (103 of them in the 1 The figure is for 1917. In another study, the adult literacy rate was reported at 3.8%, but this time for 1928 (MacKenzie 1969) .
capital city of Bukhara) with some 15,000 students. At the same time 1,800 Maktabs taught another 150,000 pupils, while Khiva, Tashkent, Samarkand, Sir Darya, and Khokand had 25, 10, 50, 21, and 118 Madrasas respectively (Allworth 1994; Skrine and Ross 1899) . Given that these institutions helped to add to the stock of literate adults continuously over time, the conventional wisdom of the Soviet writers, mentioned above, seems to be a gross underestimate of the real picture.
Teachings at Madrasas were based on the seminar/tutorial system and successful graduates would develop into all-round intellectuals, as described below by Allworth (1994: 349) : The graduates would then expect to become employed as 'a teacher or professor, a secretary to merchants, nobility, or other men of affairs, manager of a philanthropic institution, a judge or law clerk, or as a last resort a member of clergy ' (ibid: 354) . In other words, whatever profession they chose, they would become leading intellectuals in the community.
In short, although the education system of this period was not free from problems, through maktabs and madrasas funded by the landed estates, it provided the general public with reasonable opportunities for free education and in this sense satisfied at least the minimum need of a feudalistic society for intellectual minds. The system provided talented individuals with an opportunity to achieve their potential and offered them the limited upward social mobility afforded by an otherwise rigid feudal society. The society was rigid in the sense that, it protected the privileges of the royal and upper class families and the best the ordinary people could hope for were clerical positions at royal courts or similar government related offices.
However, although the education system of this period had appropriate structures and institutions that met the requirements of a feudalistic society, which had already become past history in the more advanced Western capitalist countries, it was outdated and suffered from a number of weaknesses.
First, the quality of education was not uniform throughout all educational institutions and furthermore the majority of the population did not even attain an education good enough to enable them to read and write. Only a handful of madrasas in big cities such as Mir-Arab in Bukhara and Beklarbegi in Tashkent could boast of the kind of quality described by Allworth. Secondly, even the top institutions were far behind their European counterparts, especially in terms teaching science subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, engineering, etc.
A group of local intellectuals, inspired by the Muslim enlightenment movements in European Russia, initiated a reform movement which later became known as Jadidism. 2 The Jadids, as the movement members were called, actively promoted reforms in the methodology of teaching and the ways it was organized and administered at local Maktabs and Madrasas. They also published new text books and introduced new subjects to be taught in these institutions. As most of the members of the reform movement were from wealthy merchant families, they had travelled around the world, were aware of the progress made in the Western world and were particularly inspired by the works of the 'Young Turks' movement in Turkey. The Jadids also set up a foundation that sponsored talented youth who wanted to continue their studies abroad, mainly in Germany.
Unfortunately, the reform movement in Central Asia faced a formidable opposition from such traditionalists as the members of the clergy. The clergy were able to stifle most of the proposed reforms because of their direct involvement in the administration of maktabs and madrasas. As a result., 2 The name comes from Arabic name Usouli-Jadid, meaning the New Method, given to a collection of new methods employed in the reformed schools in the Muslim part of the Russian Empire during the late 19 th and beginning of the 20 th centuries. For detailed discussion of Jadidism see Khalid (1998) .
undeterred by their unsuccessful attempts to introduce changes to the existing schools, the Jadids opened their own schools, a total of 92 of them by 1917, and created new text books for the use in these schools (Vaidyanath 1967) .
Surprisingly, at least in the earlier years of the Bolshevik revolution, the Jadids found more support for their cause from the new Soviet government and took high ranking positions in the first Communist administration in Central Asia. However, that co-operation did not last very long, because the Jadid ideology contradicted the Soviet plans for turning Central Asians into homogeneous Soviet citizens or 'Homo Sovieticus', who would speak the same language (Russian) and share the same Marxist-atheist culture.
The essence of the conflict, also common in other parts of the Soviet Union at the time and termed the 'Red Expert problem' in the literature, was that, although the Communist Party held political power in key areas of social and economic life, at the grassroots levels they had to rely too much on the indigenous experts and managers, who did not necessarily share the communist vision and ideology; and in fact more often than not resisted reforms introduced by the Communists.
By the 1930s the Communist Party apparatus had completed the 'liberation' of the country from the hands of the non-Party specialists and replaced them by a newly created class of 'Red-experts', who by now had acquired adequate technical training and skills to deal with the issues of the economy themselves (Guroff 1983: 202) . In reality, the Communists went a step further in their pursuit of solving the 'Red Expert' problem, as they purged everyone with the slightest perceived connection with the previous regime. Unfortunately, the purges swept away not only the Jadid reforms but also the personalities associated with the Jadid movement; as most of these pioneers of the early educational reform either had to leave the country or were executed before the end of the 1930s.
Soviet Educational Reforms
The October Revolution of 1917 brought about changes, unprecedented both in scale and pace. The existing system was completely abolished and replaced by a system that was entirely secular and based on Marxist/Leninist ideology. By 1924-25, when the Uzbek SSR was officially formed, there were 981 primary and middle schools with an estimated 75,000 pupils, 23 colleges, 8 professional-industrial schools, and 8 industrial schools (Vaidyanath 1967) . Not a single aspect or element of the old system, including the reforms introduced by the Jadids, was allowed to be carried over; even the teachers and instructors were not spared. 3 The Central Asian State University, the first of its kind in the region, and the Communist University of Tashkent were also established during that period. The graduates from these new institutions were fast-tracked into appointments at all levels of academic and administrative positions in spite of their lack of experience.
By 1938-39, there were 1.1 million pupils at schools out of a population of about 6.3 million and there were 29 institutions of higher education, 105 technical high schools, and 23 scientific research institutes (Mandell 1942 ). The new system was initially geared towards eradicating illiteracy and therefore the greatest allocation of placements at the newly established universities was for the educators. As Table 1 shows, about 1,700 pedagogical specialists graduated from higher education institutions in 1940, and their number increased to about 24,000 by 1951-55. The table also shows that the higher education institutions initiated the preparation of specialists en masse in areas, which had not been studied before the revolution, such as engineering, heavy industry, transport and communications, agriculture, and economics. Source: Medlin and Cave (1962: 168) The new institutions of higher education also developed research facilities in all areas and the number of people choosing scientific research as a career increased significantly over time. As Table 2 shows, within a relatively short period of time between the 1930s and 1950s, despite the disruptions of World War II, the education system in Uzbekistan achieved considerable progress both in terms of the number of graduates and scientific personnel. According to the 1959 population survey 4 , the 'intelligentsia' in Uzbekistan consisted of over 210,000 professionals, 50.8% of whom were employed in education and research, while 23.2% worked in the health care sector. 3) Doctors of Science 159 183 Source: Medlin and Cave (1964) Thus, by secularizing the local population, which for many centuries had lived according to two of its main goals: universal literacy; and social engineering.
In short, the education system Uzbekistan inherited from its communist past consisted of the following elements: secondary schools, vocational schools or "professional-technical schools" (PTUs known as 'uchilishye'), technical schools or "specialized secondary schools" (SSUZs called 'technikums'), and higher education institutions (VUZs) that included both universities and specialized institutes. Prior to 1984 the legally-required period of secondary schooling in the USSR was ten years, of which eight years were compulsory; after this time the age of entry into primary schools was reduced from seven to six years. As a result, most children after this date received eleven years of schooling, which extended the compulsory years of schooling to nine. PTUs and SSUZs provided alternatives to the last two non-compulsory years of schooling. There were about 8,000 PTUs and 4,500 SSUZs in the USSR in 1990. Graduates of PTUs and SSUZs could compete for places in VUZs, but in 1986 only 2% from PTUs and 4% from SSUZs, in contrast to 15% from general secondary schools, successfully enrolled.
The VUZs offered five-year degree courses. The graduates of both VUZs and SSUZs were subject to administrative assignments for the first three years of employment. There were about 900 institutions of higher education in the USSR in 1990 of which only 69, with nearly 600,000 students, were classified as universities. Around five million students were enrolled in VUZs, 40% of which were enrolled in courses taught in the evenings or by correspondence. An interesting fact about higher education specialization in the USSR was that the majority of courses offered in VUZs were geared towards technical careers; over 40% of graduates from VUZs were classified as engineers (IMF 1991: 166-68) .
By 1989, the rate of adult literacy in Uzbekistan had reached 99% and the total number of students studying at the country's higher education system was 331.6 thousand (with a male/female ratio of 58.5/41.5). Nevertheless, placements in higher education institutions in Uzbekistan remained under-funded; the average number of placements per 10,000 people in Uzbekistan (167) was well below that of the USSR (181) (Balzer 1992: 178) . As a result, as indicated in Table 3 , the average number of applications for placements in higher education institutions was considerably higher in Uzbekistan compared to that of the USSR average, even in the late 1980s. This may partly be explained by the demographic factors. 
Educational Reforms after Independence
Historically, educational institutions had always played a very important role in the process of elite regeneration in Uzbekistan. As was discussed earlier, religious schools had produced most of the precolonial elite, while Russian language schools took over the dominant role after the Russian invasion.
During the Soviet time, the traditional route to the top was through institutions of higher education and then specialist Communist party schools. The collapse of the Communist regime brought down the whole party infrastructure, including the party schools. Hence, the old career trajectory was disturbed.
The Uzbek authorities tried to establish replacement institutions by opening new universities and upgrading the status of the older ones.
The Uzbek authorities have been giving considerable attention to reforms in the education sector, particularly in the higher education sector, since independence. The total number of institutions of higher education (IHE) increased from 57 in 1995 to 64 (32 of them are located in Tashkent) in 2005. aspects of their specialized field.
Admissions to IHEs before independence were based on oral and/or written entrance examinations, usually in three relevant subject areas, administered locally at each individual institution.
However, the growing concern about the subjectivity of such exams 6 , as well as widespread corruption in the higher education system, especially during the years of perestroika and subsequently during the early years of independence, led to the introduction of more centralized admission tests. In order to limit these corrupt practices and improve fairness in access to higher education, Uzbekistan introduced a centralized testing system in 1994 (after piloting it in 1993).
Since then entrance examinations to most higher education institutions (except for the branches of foreign ones, academies, and performance-based ones like arts and sports) have been centrally administered by the State Test Centre (STC). Applicants are still required to submit their application to a university or institute of their choice, but examination questions are prepared and marked centrally by the STC. Each year, applicants compete for a fixed number of placements for the degree programme of their choice. In any one year, each candidate is allowed to apply for one programme only. They now need to sit a uniform national test, which consists of thirty six multiple choice questions in each of the three different subjects related to the candidate's chosen field of study. To be more specific, subjects vary depending on the degree programme, for which a candidate is being tested, but the number of subjects and questions, three and thirty six respectively, are the same for every degree programme.
Moreover, subjects carry different weights for each specialization. For example, applicants for economics and business degrees are tested in mathematics, one foreign language (usually from English, German or French), and the applicant's native language (which can be Uzbek, Russian, or any other minority language); each correct answer to multiple choice questions in these subjects carries scores of 3.1, 2.1, and 1.1 respectively, hence giving the maximum achievable score of 226.8. At the end, the applicants with the highest total points scored are selected for admission.
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The Soviet higher education was universally free. However, since independence, specifically since 1994, higher education placements in Uzbekistan have been offered on a mixed funding basis: the government sponsored placements, the so called 'grants' that cover tuition fees and offer student stipends (which are scaled on students' academic performance), and the standard placements, or the so called 'contracts' under which students need to find sponsors independently or pay the tuition fees by themselves (mostly through their parents). 8 Each year the State Test Centre announces the number of fixed placements, also indicating the proportion of grant and contract placements, for each degree programme. The allocation of the fixed grant placements is based on the entrance examination results.
For example, assuming that a degree programme admits 100 fixed placements of which 40% are on grant basis and 60% are on contract basis, if 400 applications are received for the programme, only the top 100 performers in the exam will be offered placements; of these, the top 40 performers will win government-sponsored placements and the rest will be offered contract placements.
The fixed total number of placements for the 2006/07 academic year was 57,269 but 186,154 applications were received. In other words, there were 3.25 applications per placement. This shows a slight improvement from the pre-independence figure of 3.43 applications per placement. Table 4 7 There are some allegations that the new admissions system also suffers from corrupt practices in the sense that some applicants are able to cheat the system in order to obtain higher scores. However, due to the way the new system was designed, it is not possible to stop top-scoring talents from gaining admission to the degree programme of their choice; which was not guaranteed under the old system. See the ICG (2003) placement. This implies that most of the applicants have chosen to go to the geographically nearest university rather than opting to go to the ones in the capital, possibly because of higher living costs.
Secondly, an interesting fact is that, in spite of the high number of applicants, the regional university entrants achieved much lower average points in the examinations, implying that the most talented applicants are still choosing to go to the top IHE located in the capital city. Thirdly, another interesting trend is that degrees in agriculture, science, and engineering, traditionally popular during the Soviet times, have attracted the lowest number of applicants and these also have achieved lower scores in the test. Apart from medical degree programmes, which have always been popular and attracted a lot of talented applicants, the brightest candidates seem to choose the degree programme in business, economics, finance, and law. In 2006-07, the total minimum scores required to gain entry to a grant placement in the Tashkent Institute of Finance, the University of Economics, the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, and the Tashkent Institute of Law were 190.6, 191.1, 194.0, and 197.3 respectively. In other words, in order to obtain grant placements in these institutions, students needed to attain well over 85% of the total possible score of 226.8. Similarly, the total minimum score required to obtain contract placements in these institutions also ranked highest, ranging between 170.8 and 168.5, i.e. well over 74% of the total possible score. Students who are applying for popular degree schemes, such as economics, business and law, know from the previous years' entrance examination results that there is stiff competition for placements, and that, to obtain a contract placement, let alone a grant placement, is a lot more difficult in these subject areas than to obtain a grant placement in subject areas such as science and engineering.
Arguably, the popularity of some subjects is explained by the fact that spending on these degrees on a contract basis is justified because of the comparatively higher expected returns to education in these specific areas.
Although the centralization of the entrance tests administered through the newly established State
Test Centre was a radical change from the past, the comprehensive reform of the education system in the country started only in the mid 1990s. The reform programme of the education system, named 'The National Programme for Personnel Training', became law in 1997 and contained details of a three stage reform plan.
By introducing the national programme, the Uzbek government recognized the fact that a welldeveloped system of education is one of the most fundamental factors in promoting economic prosperity in a market-based environment, and therefore committed itself to creating an education system that reflected national values and produced highly qualified specialists. Moreover, the reform was seen as an opportunity to de-ideologize the education system, to improve the higher education curriculum, and to increase the range of degree programmes offered.
The first stage of the programme was planned to be carried out between 1997-2001 and envisaged the creation of appropriate infrastructure necessary to implement the programme and to achieve its targets. This stage included changing the legal status of some of the existing IHEs and creating a network of vocational colleges and academic lyceums. In particular, some specialized institutes were turned into universities and the previous system of vocational and technical schools (PTUs and SSUZs) was abandoned and replaced by specialized vocational and academic institutions called colleges and lyceums respectively. The purpose behind expanding the network of colleges and lyceums was to provide better opportunities for young people who finished secondary schools after nine or eleven years of schooling but failed to get into higher education. The published text of the programme quoted that only 10% of the school graduates were able to enrol in IHEs and the rest had to enter the labour market untrained. The new system of colleges would offer them a chance to gain some basic technical and vocational skills and increase their employability. As Table 5 shows, the number of students enrolled in IHE has also increased dramatically during 2000-06. In 2000, IHE in Uzbekistan offered about forty five thousand placements at undergraduate level and about three thousand placements at postgraduate (master's degree programmes only) level; by 2006 these figures went up to about sixty one thousand and six thousand respectively. The total number of students increased from about 184,000 to about 286,000 in 2006. An increase of more than 100,000 in six years shows the speed with which the higher education system has been growing over the past several years. Since no specific target was set regarding the third stage and the duration of this stage was not mentioned, it is difficult to assess the extent of the implementation of the third stage at present. Source: National Committee for Statistics (2007) Maintained at about 9% of GDP, the country's expenditure on education is higher than that in any other country in the region-indeed, higher than that in any OECD country (World Bank, 2005) .
However, as Table 6 shows, the share of expenditure on higher education, as a percentage of GDP, has gradually fallen since 2000, although the total expenditure on education has remained in the region of 9% of GDP. This trend is a part of the Uzbek government's strategy to increase the proportion of contract-based placements in higher education and to divert more resources to vocational-professional training.
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9 As a result, the proportion of grant-based placements in IHE fell from an average of 38% in 2005 38% in to 34% in 2008 38% in (STC, 2008 . The proportion of grant placements does not differ significantly from subject to subject, ranging between the 35% 42% of the total fixed placements. 
Limitations of the Present System and Suggested Recommendations
The evolution of the education system in Uzbekistan has been examined over three distinctive social and political orders. In each one of these periods the educational system played a crucial role in the way the Uzbek society functioned. In the first period, the educational system was dominated by religious leaders and became a main bone of contention between old elites and new enlightenment movements -the Jadidism. Nevertheless, the old educational system, even in its unreformed, backward state, did deliver graduates that were of sufficient quality and calibre to meet the demands of the society in which it functioned.
When the backward education system of the feudalistic central Asia was seriously challenged by the far superior system and methods of education in advanced capitalist countries, the education sector turned into a battle ground of experiments and disagreements between the status quo of the existing elite and new ideas put forward by the Jadid movement. The Soviet authorities saw potential danger in the continuation of the Jadid movement's influence in the education system. They made it a priority to control and radically reshape the education system by means of massive investments in both infrastructure and human capital to make sure they gained full control of the hearts and minds of their subjects.
The Soviet educational system has always been hailed as a great success story for eradicating illiteracy and achieving very high levels of internationally-recognized scientific excellence. The system provided the Soviet citizens with opportunities to choose education and research as a career choice and also served as a road map for other careers. A successful academic record was virtually a prerequisite for ambitious people in all sectors of the economy. The Communist Party successfully utilized the educational system in its entirety, from primary schools to institutions of higher education, to groom and promote the cadre it needed for its continuous leadership renewal. Excessive industrialization and militarization of USSR, partly due to the demands of the Cold War, resulted in a higher educational system which had as much as 40% of its degree programmes classified as technical-engineering related.
Many countries of the former Soviet Union failed to maintain the level of expenditure on the education system after the break down of the USSR. As far as Uzbekistan is concerned, however, despite the economic difficulties of the early years of transition in the 1990s, the country was able not only to maintain but also to increase the level of spending on the education sector (Ruziev et al. 2007 ).
The country has been carrying out large-scale reforms in its education system since independence. The Uzbek government's commitment to this cause is noteworthy, as indicated by the scale and continuity of the reforms in this sector. The country's expenditure on education, maintained at about 9% of GDP during transition, is higher than that in any other country in the region -indeed, higher than that in any OECD country.
The fact that so much of the resources of the country have been directed to this sector begs the important questions of whether the reforms have been effective and can be further improved. This study does not claim to give any definitive answers to these questions. Rather, it highlights the scale and continuity of education reforms and attempts to open a debate on this topic.
This study draws attention to two important drawbacks of the system of higher education and suggests changes that could improve its efficiency considerably. The first serious drawback of the system is the fact that applicants are allowed to apply for one degree programme only each year and have to choose the degree of their choice when submitting their application. As a result, if applicants fail to achieve the necessary total score to be admitted to their degree of choice, they will not have another chance to apply to another similar degree programme in the same academic year.
For example, applicants for business and economics-related degrees are tested on three separate subjects, namely, mathematics, a foreign language, and the applicant's first language. According to the 2005-06 entrance examination results, an applicant who chose an economics degree at the Tashkent State University of Economics would be given a grant or contract placement only if he or she scored above 91% and 85% of the total respectively. However, in the same year, for the same degree programme, the minimum passing scores for grant placements and contract placements were about 40% and 30% of the total respectively at the Ferghana State University. An applicant who earned, say, 80% of the total score would fail to get into the Higher Education System altogether if he or she submitted his or her application to the Tashkent State University of Economics in that year. Hence, the unnecessary rigidity of the current system, by unfairly penalizing talented applicants for being more ambitious, results in a waste of a valuable resource -talented young people.
This problem could easily be eradicated if applicants were given an option to choose from a limited number of universities, say, three for example, during the application stage, clearly indicating their first, second, and third choices. Given that the entrance examination procedures are already centralized, this change would not involve too many extra resources. One way of implementing this change would involve centralization of the application procedure by introducing a uniform application form which would be distributed to all institutions of higher education. Centralization of the application process in this way would reduce the hassle for the applicants too, as they would not need to travel from regions to the capital city where most of the popular universities are located. Applicants would go to any university that offered a degree scheme they were interested in and submit their application form clearly indicating their preferred choices. Once examination results were ready, the State Test Centre would inform the applicants of the score they achieved and whether or not it was sufficient to gain admission to any of their preferred university choices.
Alternatively, the national test could be administered before the application process, allowing the applicants to choose a degree programme they were interested in on the basis of their achieved score.
Either way, the fairness of the admission system would be improved and a larger proportion of talented applicants would be allowed into the higher education system of the country.
The second aspect of the current system, which could be improved, is the distribution of government-sponsored grant placements. According to the latest available data, the average proportion of grant placements in the total fixed placements in IHE is 34% (STC 2008) . 10 The allocation of grant placements does not differ significantly across degree programmes and institutions, meaning that the most popular degree programmes have similar proportion of grant placements to the least popular degree programmes.
The fact that in 2006-07 applicants with scores of more than 75% of the total still chose to study at the Tashkent Institute of Finance on a contract-basis instead of going to another institution where they could easily study on grant-basis illustrates the case. It might have been justified to give grants to economics, law, and business-related degrees during the early years of transition, as the economy needed administrators as well as entrepreneurial talents. However, this view and this policy seem to have outlived their justification. Considering the fact that applicants would be more willing to pay for degree programmes with higher expected returns, government funds would be better spent in areas where degrees are currently less popular but might offer more public benefit, such as engineering and general education.
As demonstrated in Section 4, the brightest applicants tend to opt for four institutions: the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, the Tashkent State University of Economics, the Tashkent Institute of Finance, and the Tashkent State Institute of Law. Unfortunately, the programmes offering degrees in agriculture, science and engineering are the least popular. Although the so called 'hard' subjects like science and engineering have never been the 'popular' subjects in any society, during the Soviet period, nevertheless, about 40% of the students who graduated from the VUZs were classified as engineers. Since scientific and technical human capital is an essential ingredient for the growth and prosperity of an economy, perhaps the policy makers should examine the reasons behind the phenomenon that the country's brightest human resources are opting for training in non-scientific and technical subjects. Only conjecture can be offered to explain this phenomenon.
Arguably, in addition to returns to education, one of the main reasons why the brightest candidates are opting out of science and engineering-related programmes is the Uzbek society's perception about security of employment. Since the state was the sole provider of secure employment in all sectors of the economy during the Soviet period, the society has become used to associating job security with employment in the public sector. Since independence, such sectors as agriculture and manufacturing have been privatized or are in the process of being gradually privatized. As a result, 'secure' employment can be found either in state administrative departments or in state-owned institutions such as banks. This could explain the overwhelming preference for training in administrative, diplomatic and legal skills on the part of the brightest minds in the society. Obviously, as the market economy matures and people's faith in the resilience of the private sector grows, this tendency will gradually change. However, the policy makers may consider looking into ways of encouraging bright students to train for skills which can help accelerate and strengthen the growth of the productive sectors of the economy. The fact remains that the brightest candidates opt for programmes which prepare them more for employment in the bureaucracy or service sector. Therefore the policymakers in Uzbekistan perhaps need to find out the reasons for the reluctance of the brightest
